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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
This case is about a subcontractor attempting to revive expired lien rights by tacking

together two separate improvements-.the construction of roadways in a residential subdivision
and the construction of cart paths on the adjoining golf course-when the first project ended
approximately 113 days before there was an enforceable agreement regarding the second project.
The lien claimant, Hap Taylor and Sons d/b/a Knife River ("K.t'1ife River"), had an
outstanding balance of$166,603.50 for the work it did on the residential roadways. Between the
time Knife River completed the roadways and the time it began working on the cart paths, the
lender, Integrated Financial Associates, recorded its deeds of trust. Knife River's outstanding
balance for the cart paths was $49,474.80. On October 27, 2007, 181 days after it completed
work on the roadways and 60 days after it completed its work on the cart paths, Knife River filed
nine separate claims of lien against different portions of the Summerwind Development, each
claim of lien seeking to recover the total amount of $217,385.8i for its combined work on the
two projects.
Integrated Financial Associates and its successors in interest, Summerwind Partners, LLC
and Idaho Golf Partners, Inc. (collectively, "IFA"), took issue with Knife River tacking these two
projects together and challenged the validity and priority of Knife River's claims of lien.
Alternatively, IF A sought to subordinate Knife River's claims of lien on the grounds that Knife
River did not designate on its claims of lien the amounts due on the two separate projects, as
required by Idaho law.

The district court fOll..T1d IFA's arguments, evidence and authority

unpersuasive and granted summary judgment declaring Knife River's claims of lien valid and

1

This amount includes a $1,307.52 charge for a repair job on the roadways.
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superior in priority to IF A's deeds of trust. Over IF A's continuing objections, the district court
entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure allowing Knife River to recover the entire amount
due for both the roadways and the cart paths from the golf course lots and to the exclusion of the
residential lots. And, even though Knife River did not work at all on the back nine-holes of the
golf course, the entire golf course was included in the decree of foreclosure.
By this appeal, IF A respectfully request that this Court reverse the district court's
decision on either or both of two independent legal matters: (i) that Knife River improperly
tacked together the roadway work and the cart path work, or (ii) that Knife River was required to
designate on its claims of lien the specific amounts due for work on the two different projects.
Alternatively, IF A requests that this Court remand the matter to the district court with
instructions requiring it to take evidence regarding the amount of land subject to Knife River's
claim oflien so that the decree of foreclosure complies with Idaho Code § 45-505.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below.
This appeal is taken upon the district court's entry of a final judgment and decree of

foreclosure following its grant of Knife River's successive motions for summary judgment and
denial of IFA's motions for summary judgment and successive motions for reconsideration.
Because the district court disposed of all matters on summary judgment, no trial was held.
C.

Concise Statement of Facts
1. General Overview.
This case involves the infrastructure development of a residential subdivision and golf

course located near Greenleaf, Idaho. The name of the project was "Summerwind at Orchard
Hills," and the owner was Union Land. Extreme Line Logistics, Inc. ("ELL") contracted with
Union Land for the work relating to the residential roadways; ELL then subcontracted with
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cross-respondent, Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., d/b/a Knife River and fonnerly known as Masco, to
do the asphalt paving. Approximately four months after the roadways were completed, ELL
contracted with Union Land to construct the golf course cart paths and ELL subsequently
subcontracted with Knife River to do some of that work. Knife River constructed cart paths on
what would become the front nine holes of the golf course.

2. Creation and Performance of the Agreement for the Residential Roadways.
Sometime in June or July of 2006, Casey Daniels, president of ELL, was approached by
Jim Conger to work on the Summerwind development. R. Vol. 6, p. 1012 (Daniels Depo. 22:2023:12). Among other things, ELL's initial scope of work on the Summerwind Project included
cutting and paving the roads for a residential subdivision. R. Vol. 6, p. 1012 (Daniels Depo.
24:3-21).

While some work involving the golf courses was contemplated at the time ELL

entered into its original contract with the developer, there was no certainty regarding the scope of
the asphalt work required for the golf courses so the golf course cart paths were not included as
part of ELL's original contract with Union Land. R. VoL 6, pp. 10 17-18 (Daniels Depo. 44 :945:12).
ELL did not place and compact asphalt so it was necessary for ELL to subcontract with
an asphalt company do that work. R. VoL 6, p. 1013 (Daniels Depo. 25:9-20). Typically,
Daniels, on behalf of ELL, would use the developer's plans to estimate the amount of asphalt
necessary to fulfill ELL's contract and then solicit bids from companies to supply, place, and
compact the asphalt. R. Vol. 6, p. 1015 (Daniels Depo. 35:25-37:14). At the time ELL solicited
bids for the residential roadways, the only asphalt work specified on the plans was work for the
residential roadways. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1017 (Daniels Depo. 44:13-15,44:23-25) and 1018 (Daniels
Depo. 45:8-12); R. Vol. 6, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo. 62:9-13). The plans did not reflect asphalt
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work for the cart paths because, at that time, the scope of work required for the cart paths was
unknown. R. Vol. 6, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo. 62:14-18). ELL estimated that it would take
approximately 6,020 tons of asphalt to complete the residential roadways and requested
proposals from local asphalt companies based on that estimate. R. Vol. 6, p. 1021 (Daniels
Depo. 60:3-23).
Knife River (then known as Masco) submitted the winning proposal.

The "Masco

Proposal" dated June 26, 2006, stated a unit price of $64.50/ton for placing fu"1d compacting
approximately 6,020 tons of asphalt (R. Vol. 6, p. 1042)--the exact amount ELL estimated to be
necessary to complete the residential roadways.
ELL and Knife River worked together building the residential roadways. ELL prepared
the roadways and Knife River completed construction by placing and compacting the asphalt. R.
Vol. 6, p. 1014 (Daniels Depo. 32:11-33:7). Knife River worked on the roadways during two
timeframes: it paved the first half from November 11, 2006, through November 14, 2006, (R.
Vol. 3, pp. 383-410) and paved the second half from April 20, 2007, through April 27, 2007 (R.
Vol. 3, pp. 357-82). Knife River's employees logged all of their time for the roadways under job
number 66062. R. Vol. 3, p. 357-410. The roadways are complete. R. Vol. 6, p. 1011 (Daniels
Depo. 20: 15-18).

The last date any Knife River employee logged time under job number

66062-the roadway job number-was April 27, 2007. See, e.g., R. Vol. 3, p. 371.
Knife River's May 25,2007, invoice to ELL for the roadway work shows an outstanding
balance of $166,603.50. R. Vol. 7, p. 1153. The roadway invoice references the roadway job
number 2566062, the last five numbers being identical to the job number used by Knife River's
employees to track their time on the project. R. Vol. 7, p. 1153.
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3. IFA's Deeds of Trust.
IFA recorded its interests in the property on July 13, 2007. R. Vol. 4, p. 600,

~

10; R.

Vol. 4, p. 621, ~ 15.

4. Creation and Performance of the Agreement for the Cart Paths.
ELL and the developer had two separate contracts for the roadway work and the cart path
work. R. Vol. 6, p. 1048; 1017 (Daniels Depo. 44:6-8). On August 15, 2007, ELL sent the
developer a proposal for the cart path work. R. Vol. 6, p. 1044. Though Daniels had previously
discussed the possibility of cart path work with individuals at Knife River (R. Vol. 6, p. 1022
(Daniels Depo. 63:3-65:25)), when ELL submitted its initial cart path proposal to Union Land,
ELL did not intend to subcontract the asphalt work for the cart paths. R. Vol. 6, p. 1027 (Daniels
Depo. 83 :21-84: 10). Rather, ELL planned to do that work itself. R. Vol. 6, p. 1027 (Daniels
Depo.83:21-84:10).
On August 16, 2007, the day after ELL submitted a proposal to the developer for cart
path work and nearly four months after Knife River had completed the residential roadways,
ELL requested that Knife River prepare a change order estimating its cost for supplying asphalt
for and paving the cart paths. R. Vol. 3, p. 3312; R. Vol. 7, p. 1124; see also R. Vol. 6, p. 1036
(Daniels Depo. 118:24-119:8). Typically, when dealing with a "unit based" contract ELL would
not solicit change orders; it would simply request additional work under the existing unit based
contract. R. Vol. 6, p. 1016-17 (Daniels Depo. 40:24-41:6). Because the discussions regarding
who would construct the cart paths and how the cost would be determined changed so frequently
during that timeframe, Daniels was unable to recall with any degree of certainty how the parties

2 The Rosin Affidavit correctly describes the small job worksheet for the cart path work, the exhibit attached to the
affidavit was the small job work sheet for a patch/repair job on the residential roadways. The correct small job
worksheet is found at R. Vol. 7, p. 1124.
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finally settled upon the price for Knife River's work on the cart paths. R. Vol. 6, p. 1028
(Daniels Depo. 85:23-87:18).
During the course of the proceedings below, ELL and Knife River both claimed that they
intended for the cart path work to be part of the Masco Proposal. R. Vol. 7, p. 1093 (Rosin Aff.,

,-r 14). However, both Knife River and ELL acknowledge that the cart path work was additional
work that was not specifically contemplated by the Masco Proposal. R. Vol. 3, p. 331 (Rosin
Aff, ~ 12); R. Vol. 6, pp. 1032-33 (Daniels Depo. 104:15-105:1).
Knife River worked on-site constructing the cart paths from August 17, 2007, to August
29,2007. R. Vol. 3, pp. 340-54. The first date that Knife River's employees logged any time for
the cart path work was August 17,2007 (R. Vol. 3, p. 347), 113 days after Knife River finished
working on the residential roadways. R. Vol. 3, p. 371. Knife River worked on only the front
nine holes of the golf course. R. Vol. 6, p. 10 11 (Daniels Depo. 20: 19-21: 17). Knife River's
employees logged their time for the cart path work under job number 77423 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 34054), not the 66062 job number that had been used for the roadway work (R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-410).
The back nine holes were not paved and no prep work was done. R. Vol. 6, p. 1012 (Daniels
Depo.21:12-17).
The cart path invoice of $49,474.80 is dated August 29,2007, and references job number
2577423. R. Vol. 7, p. 1155. Consistent with the pattern seen on the roadways invoice, the last
five numbers on the cart path invoice are the same numbers that Knife River's employees used to
log their time for work on the cart path project. Compare R. Vol. 3, p. 340-345 and R. Vol. 7, p.
1155 (cart path employee logs and invoice) with R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-410 and R. Vol. 7, p. 1153
(roadway employee logs and invoice).
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5. Patch-job work.
On July 16,2007, Knife River did a small repair job to fix a part of the asphalt that had
been damaged by construction activities. R. Vol. 3, p. 338. Daniels has no recollection of
authorizing this work and testified that he believed it was ordered by his foreman to cover up
some damage to the residential roadways caused by ELL. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1030-31 (Daniels Depo.
96:2-97:4). Daniels confirmed that the small job worksheet for the patch job did not make any
reference to the cart paths. R. Vol. 6, p. 1030 (Daniels Depo. 97:5-9).
Knife River employees tracked their work for the patch job with job number 77351. R.
Vol. 3, p. 355-56. The roadway patch job invoice for $1,307.52 is dated July 16, 2007, and
references job number 2577351. R. Vol. 7, p. 1154. Consistent with the pattern seen on the
roadways and the cart paths, this reference matches the number that Knife River employees used
to track their time for that job. R. Vol. 3, pp. 355-56.
6.

Knife River's claims of lien.

At the time it filed its claims of lien, Knife River had three unpaid invoices totaling
$217,385.82: $166,603.50 for the roadways, $49,474.80 for the cart paths, and $1,307.52 for the
patch job. R. Vol. 7, pp. 1153-55. On October 25, 2007, Knife River filed nine separate liens
for its work; each lien claimed the full amount due on the combined projects-$217,385.82:
1. Phase I: Lots 1 and 9, Block 2 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 497-99) ("Laidlaw Lien")
2. Phase II: Lot 48, Block 1 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 512-14) ("Aebischer Lien")
3. Phase II: Lot 52, Block 1 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 526-28) ("Youngblood Lien")
4. Phase II: Lot 8, Block 4 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 541-43) (,'Scott Lien")
5. Phase II: Lot 17, Block 4 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 556-69) ("Benson Lien")
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6. Phase II: Lot 62, Block 1 and Lot 10, Block 4 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 573-75) ("Status Homes
Lien")

7. Lien on remainder of Phase II (R. Vol. 4, pp. 591-93) ("Phase II Lien")
8. Lien on remainder of Phase I (R. Vol. 4, pp. 611-13) ("Phase I Lien")
9. Lien on Lot 20, Block 43 ("Zameke Lien").
Knife River settled with the Aebishers, Bensons, Laidlaws, Scotts, Youngbloods, and Zamekes
based on apportioned amounts that Knife River set forth in its foreclosure complaints. R. Vol. 6,
p. 864 (Krueck Aff.,

~~

10 & 11). Liens numbered 7 and 8 above are the liens at issue in this

lawsuit.
Approximately six months into the foreclosure action, for the stated purpose of
"providing constructive notice of the amounts the plaintiffs sought in its foreclosure actions"
counsel for Knife River prepared partial lien releases (R. Vol. 6, p. 864 (Krueck Aff.,

~

9)),

reducing the amount claimed on the Phase I Lien from $217,385.82 to $114,845.32 (R. Vol. 6,
pp. 869-71) and reducing the amount claimed on the Phase II Lien from $217,385.82 to
$84,083.21 (R. Vol. 6, pp. 872-74).

7.

Current Ownership of the Properties.

While this action was pending, IF A foreclosed on its deeds of trust.

The following

Trustee's Deeds were recorded, each naming the grantee as Summerwind Partners, LLC, a
special purpose entity comprised of the investors in the IFA loan: 4
1. Phase II: Lot 18, Block 4, recorded on March 17,2009 (R. Vol. 7, pp. 1 77-78);
2. Phase II: Lots 49-51,53-61,63-65,67-68, Block 1, recorded on Jan 29,2009 (R. Vol.
7, pp. 1179-80);

3

4

The Zarneke Lien does not appear in the record.
IFA is a member ofSummerwind Partners, LLC. R. Vol. 9, p. 1470.
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3. Phase I: Lots 1, 2-14, 16 and 18, Block 1, recorded on January 29, 2009 (R. Vol. 7,
pp. 1181-82);
4. Phase I: Lots 15 & 17, Block 1, recorded on January 29,2009 (R. Vol. 7, pp. 118384).
5. Phase I: Lots 19-38,39, & 40, Block 1, recorded on January 29,2009 (R. Vol. 7, pp.
1185-86).
6. Phase I:

Lots 2-8, 10-14, Block 2; Lot 15 Block 2; Lot 1, Block 3, and

Phase II Lots 2-7, 9, 11-16, and 19, Block 4 recorded on January 29,2009 (R. Vol. 7,
pp. 1187-88);
On February 15, 2011, Summerwind Partners, LLC recorded a special warranty deed that
conveyed the golf course lots to Idaho Golf Partners, LLC (R. Vol. 9, pp. 1458-64):
•

Phase I: Lots 1, 16, 17, 18,39, and 40, Block 1;

•

Phase I: Lot 15, Block 2;

•

Phase II: Lots 41 and 66, Block 1;

•

Phase II: Lot 1, Block 4.

The front nine holes of the golf course are located on Phase I. R. Vol. 8, p. 1270. The back
nine-holes of the golf course are located on Phase II. R. Vol. 8, p. 1271.

8. Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure
IFA filed for bankruptcy protection on March 14, 2011. R. Vol. 9, p. 1470. After
receiving notice of IF A's filing, Knife River moved for entry of judgment against only the golf
course lots on the grounds that neither IF A nor Surnrnerwind Partners, LLC held any ownership
interest in the golf course lots. R. Vol. 9, p. 1470. Knife River reasoned that it could attempt to
collect as much as possible from the golf course lots and, if that sale was insufficient to satisfy its
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lien, it would then seek relief from the automatic stay and seek a judgment against the remaining
subdivision lots. R. Vol. 9, p. 1472. IFA opposed the motion. R. Vol. 9, pp. 1476-82.
Before the district court ruled on Knife River's motion, Summerwind Partners, LLC tIled
for bankruptcy protection. R. Vol. 9, p. 1495. Knife River moved for entry of judgment a
second time. R. Vol. 9, p. 1490. At oral argument, counsel for IF A and Summerwind Partners,
LLC, renewed the objection to the form of judgment and relief requested. R. VoL 9, p. 1534.
The district court granted Knife River's motion and entered ajudgment and decree of foreclosure
allowing Knife River to recover for its claims oflien on the golf course lots only. R. Vol. 9, pp.
1534 & 1543-51.

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Whether a lien claimant may tack together work on two projects when 113 days elapse
between completion of the first project and reaching an enforceable agreement regarding
the scope of work on the second project.

2.

Whether the construction of residential roadways and golf course cart paths constitute the
types of improvements to which Idaho Code Section 45-508 applies.

3.

Alternatively, whether the district court erred in refusing to apply Idaho Code Section
45-505 to claims of liens arising from construction of improvements to the land.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issues presented by this appeal involve statutory interpretation and whether the
district court properly applied the facts to the law when granting Knife River's motions for
summary judgment. This court reviews an appeal from an order granting summary judgment on
the same grounds as the district court when deciding a motion for summary judgment. A & J
Canst. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). Review of the district

court's interpretation of a statute is an issue of law, over which this Court exercises free review.
Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013).

This Court also exercises free

review of the application of undisputed facts found to the law. Union Pac. Corp. v. Idaho State
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Tax Comm'n, 139 Idaho 573, 575, 83 P.3d 116, 118 (2004). Accordingly, this Court exercises
free review over all matters subject to this appeal.
IV.

ARGUMENT

This Court should reverse the decision and order of the district court granting K..llife
River's motion for summary judgment regarding the validity and priority of its mechanic's lien
over IF A's deeds of trust because such decision was based on Knife River improperly tacking
together work done pursuant to two separate contracts or agreements in order to revive expired
lien rights. As an additional or alternate basis, this Court should order that Knife River's claims
of lien are subordinate to IF A's interest in the property because Idaho Code § 45-508 required
Knife River to apportion on its claims of lien the amounts due for roadway work from the
amounts due for cart path work. Finally, if this Court rejects both prior arguments, this Court
should hold that the district court committed reversible error by entering a judgment and decree
of foreclosure without first taking evidence, as required by Idaho Code § 45-505, regarding the
amount ofland necessary for the convenient use and occupation of the land subject to the lien.

A.

The district court erred by allowing Knife River to tack two separate projects
together to revive an expired lien.
The district court should have found that Knife River's lien claims for the roadway work

were untimely and that Knife River's lien claims for the cart path work were subordinate to
IFA's deeds of trust.
A lien claimant is required to file its claim of lien within 90 days after the completion of
the labor or services giving rise to the claim of lien. IDAHO CODE § 45-507. Knife River
completed its work on the roadways on April 27, 2007. R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-82. Knife River did
not file its claims oflien until October 25,2007, 181 days after it completed the roadways. See,

e.g., R. Vol. 4, pp. 591-93 and 611-13. Because Knife River's claims of lien were not filed
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within 90 days of completion of the roadways, the liens-insofar as they encompass roadway
work-are untimely.
Mechanic's liens obtain their priority date from the date the lien claimant commenced
working on the project. IDAHO CODE § 45-506. Knife River did not enter into an enforceable
agreement to work on the cart paths until August 16, 2007 (R. Vol. 3, p. 331 and R. Vol. 7, p.
1124) and did not start cart path work until August 17,2007 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 340-54). IFA
recorded its deeds of trust on July 13,2007, more than a month prior. R. VoL 4, p. 600, ,10; R.
Vol. 4, p. 621, ~ 15. Because Knife River commenced work on the cart paths after IFA recorded
its deeds of trust, the liens-insofar as they encompass cart path work-are junior to IF A's deeds
of trust.
The district court improperly allowed Knife River to tack its work on these two projects
together, thereby allowing Knife River to revive expired lien rights for its work on the roadway
and giving priority to Knife River for its work on the cart paths. Because Knife River should not
have been allowed to tack these two projects together, the district court's decision regarding
validity and priority should be reversed.
1.

Knife River had two separate contracts with ELL regarding the residential
roadways and the golf course cart paths.

The undisputed facts of this case establish that the roadways and the cart paths were not
constructed pursuant to a single contract. In order for a contract to come into being, it must be
sufficiently certain and definite to identify what acts are expected and when performance is
completed. Dales'Service Co. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 664, 534 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1975). If
material terms are left open for negotiation, then no contract comes into being.

Spokane

Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investment, LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 621, 226 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2010)
(quoting Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P.3d 974, 984 (2005)
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(quoting from 17A Am. Jr. 2d Contracts s. 181 (2004))). Lien claimants are not permitted to
tack two contracts together in order to extend the time for filing their lien. Valley Lumber v.

Driessei, 13 Idaho 662, 669, 93 P. 765, 767 (1907).
When Knife River and ELL entered into the Masco Proposal, the scope of work required
for the roadways was the only scope of work sufficiently certain and definite to give rise to an
enforceable contract. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1017 (Daniels Depo. 44:13-15, 44:23-25) and 1018 (Daniels
Depo. 45:8-12); R. Vol. 6, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo. 62:9-13). This is because, at the time of the
Masco Proposal, ELL did not have a contract for the cart paths. R. Vol. 6, p. 1022 (Daniels
Depo. 62: 14-18). The reason ELL did not have a contract for the cart paths was that no one
knew when the cart paths would be constructed, how they would be constructed, who would
construct them, where they would be located, or what they would cost. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1017-1018
(Daniels Depo. 44:9-45:12). Given that ELL did not have a contract for the cart paths, and that
none of the material terms regarding the cart paths were known, it is not possible that the Maseo
Proposal was "sufficiently certain and definite" to give rise to an enforceable contract regarding
the cart paths. The district court erred in concluding that the Masco Proposal governed both
projects.

2.

Lien claimants should not be permitted to revive expired lien rights by
adding an additional scope of work to a completed contract.

As a result of concluding that the roadways and cart paths were both done pursuant to the
Maseo Proposal, the district court impermissibly allowed Knife River to revive its expired lien
rights by virtue of an alleged "change order" to a completed contract. 5 Under Idaho law, a lien

The district court found that because of the lack of specificity in the Masco Proposal and, because language in the
Masco Proposal allowed for overages and price increases for the roadway asphalt, that the subsequent addition of
asphalt to complete the cart path project was consistent with the original Masco Proposal. IFA's December 10,
2013, Motion to Augment the Record to include Order on Defendant IFA's Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 26,2010 ("October 26,2010 Order") at 19.
5
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claimant cannot extend the time for filing its claim of lien by engaging in trivial work. Mitchell
v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 231,506 P.2d 455,458 (1972). A lien claimant also cannot extend the
time for filing by tacking two separate contracts together. Valley Lumber & Manufacturing, Co.
v. Driessel, 13 Idaho 662, 669, 93 P. 756, 767 (1907) (citing Central Loan & Trust Co. v.
O'Sullivan, 44 Neb. 834,63 N.W. 5 (1895)). Along these same lines:

Where all the items of an account except the last few were supplied
under one contract and that contract was executed and the
transaction closed, held, that the time for filing a lien could not be
extended by furnishing on a new request additional articles and
adding them to the completed account.
Id. (quoting Schulenburg v. Vrooman, 7 Mo. App. 133 (1879)).

Knife River completed the roadways on April 27, 2007. R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-382. ELL did
not enter into a contract for the cart path work until August 15, 2007, (R. Vol. 6, pp. 1044)
approximately 112 days after Knife River completed the roadways and approximately 22 days
after Knife River's lien rights for the roadways expired. Until that time, the material terms
required to give rise to a contractual obligation for the cart path were still not in place. Indeed, it
was not until August 15, 2007-when Union Land and ELL contracted for the cart path workthat ELL even had authority to subcontract the cart path work out to Knife River. And, it was
not until August 16,2007, that ELL decided it would actually subcontract the cart path work to
Knife River, rather than do the work itself. Significantly, if ELL had decided to not use Knife
River for the cart path work, Knife River would not have been afforded the opportunity to tack
the two projects together.
The district court found that the small job worksheet was properly characterized as a
"change order" that served only to modify the existing Masco Proposal by requesting more of the
same types of materials and services. Oct 27, 2010 Order at 17-24. However, even if this Court
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finds that the golf course was an amendment to the existing contract, because the material terms
related to the cart paths were not sufficiently definite and certain to give rise to an enforceable
agreement between ELL and Knife River until August 16, 2007, 113 days after Knife River
completed the roadways, Knife River should not be allowed to use this alleged amendment to a
completed contract to revive its expired lien rights.
3.

A 113-day lapse oftime between two projects should, as a matter oflaw, have
put Knife River on notice of two contracts between ELL and Union Land.

Though it is undisputed that ELL and Union Land had two separate contracts relating to
the cart path work, the district court erroneously found that there was no evidence that Knife
River had knowledge of facts sufficient to put it on notice of the separate contracts. Standing
alone, the fact of a 113-day time lapse between Knife River completing the roadways and
reaching an agreement regarding the cart path should be sufficient as a matter of law to have put
Knife River on notice that ELL might have had two separate contracts with Union Land.
Current case law requires that lien claimants exercise some degree of diligence in
protecting their lien rights. If a lien claimant has knowledge of facts indicating that two separate
contracts exist between a contractor and an owner, the subcontractor may be charged with
knowledge of those separate contracts. Gem State Lumber Co. v. School District No.8, 44 Idaho
359, 363, 256 P. 949, 950 (1927). "Lapse of time" and "cessation of work" are two types of
facts that put a lien claimant on notice that there might be two contracts between the contractor
and owner. Valley Lumber v. Driessel, 13 Idaho 662, 681, 93 P. 765, 772 (1908); see also Gem
State Lumber Co. v. School Dist. No.8, 44 Idaho 359, 362, 256 P. 949 (1927) (indicating that at

some point a lapse of time becomes unreasonable). Unlike a strict materialman who delivers
materials to a job site and then leaves, when a subcontractor is on the job site to complete a
specific portion of a project, it is axiomatic that the subcontractor has actual knowledge of the
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status and the project. Franklin Building Supply v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 851, 87 P.3d 955,
960 (2004).
There can be no justifiable basis for a subcontractor who is working on-site a.l1d who has
completed the portion of work required by its existing contract to wait 113 days-a time frame
beyond which his lien rights would otherwise expire-for the possibility of future work on a
related project. If the future work does not materialize, the subcontractor will have lost its lien
rights. At a minimum, a subcontractor expecting that more work might be forthcoming-but not
having a contract sufficiently certain and definite to guarantee that future work-should be
expected to inquire as to when and pursuant to what authority additional work might be
authorized. A subcontractor should not be allowed to sit idly by while its lien rights expire in the
hope of obtaining future work that it can then tack onto the previously completed contract for
purposes of reviving expired lien rights.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that Knife River completed the roadway
work on April 27, 2007, but did not reach an agreement regarding the cart path work until
August 16,2007, 113 days later. At a minimum, Knife River should have been asking questions
of ELL regarding whether the cart path work the parties had previously considered would
actually materialize. In those inquiries, Knife River could have and should have iearned that
ELL did not yet have a contract for the cart path work. Because the lapse of time between
completing one project and being assigned the next project was enough that Knife River's lien
rights for the roadways would have otherwise expired, this 113-day lapse of time should be
sufficient, as a matter of law, to have put Knife River on notice that there were two contracts
between ELL and Union Land. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's order
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insofar as it concluded that Knife River had no reason to know of the existence of two contracts
between ELL and Union Land.
B.

The district court erred in concluding that Idaho Code § 45-508 did not require
Knife River to apportion on its claim of lien the amounts due for the roadway
project and the cart path project.
Even if this Court finds that only one contract governed both the roadway project and the

cart path project, it should still overrule the district court's decision that Knife River's claims of
lien are superior to IF A's deeds of trust because Knife River did not designate on its claims of
lien the amounts due for the roadway work and the amounts due for the cart path work. IDAHO
CODE § 45-508 provides that when
... one (1) claim is filed against two (2) or more buildings, mines,
mining claims, or other improvements owned by the same person,
the person filing such claim must, at the same time, designate the
amount due him on each of said buildings, mines, mining claims,
or other improvement; otherwise, the lien of such claim is
postponed to other liens.
The district court held that section 45-508 did not apply to Knife River's claims of lien because
the roadways and cart paths constituted a single improvement, constmcted under a single
contract (Order Granting Motion to Augment the Clerk's Record dated November 19, 2013,
enclosing Order on Defendant IF A's Second Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiff s Second
Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 23,2011 ("Dec. 23, 2011 Order") at 11-13) and,
further, that the roadways and cart paths were not the types of improvements subject to 45-508

(ld. at 7-10).
This Court should overrule the district court's holding on these points for two reasons:
First, the undisputed evidence shows that Knife River apportioned the work at every phase of the
two projects; second, the language of Idaho Code § 45-501, the legislative history of Idaho's
Mechanic's lien statutes, and the language of Idaho's Contractor's Registration Act all point to
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the conclusion that roadways and cart paths are properly classified as "structures" and the district
court's classification was incorrect.
1.

The residential roadways and golf course cart paths are two separate
improvements, readily capable of apportionment.

As a threshold issue, this Court must decide if roadways and cart paths are a single,
indivisible improvement, or two separate and distinct improvements. If there is nothing to be
apportioned, section 45-508 simply does not apply.
The rule to be derived from the principals of Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v.
Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, which relied heavily on the California case of Warren v. Hopkins, is

that the mandate of section 45-508 requires a lien claimant to designate or apportion amounts
due and owing on separate projects where it is feasible to do so; however, the statute does not
require apportionment when it would create an artificial or arbitrary designation of amounts due.
151 Idaho 740, 746,264 P.3d 379,384 (2011) (discussing Warren v. Hopkins, 110 Cal. 506,42
P. 986 (Cal. 1895».
Unlike the present case, both Warren and Hopkins Northwest involved situations where
apportionment was neither practical nor feasible. In Warren the work at issue involved leveling
two adjacent lots, owned by the same person, by taking dirt from one and filling in the other.
Warren, 110 Cal. at 511, 42 P. at 987-88. The price for the work was fixed at "ten cents per

cubic yard for filling." Id The Warren Court found that it was not possible to designate the
separate amounts chargeable to the two blocks and concluded that statutory apportionment was
not required. Id
While the improvements at issue in Hopkins Northwest were of a more complex nature,
the analysis remained the same. In Hopkins Northwest, the lien claimant was obligated by a
single contract to construct a golf course, with all its component parts: driving range, tee boxes,
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fairways, greens, and other components. 151 Idaho at 747, 264 P. 3d at 386. The golf course
was constructed as a single project, not its separate component parts. Id.

And, perhaps most

significantly, "'nothing in the record indicates that either [the lien claimant's] work or the
compensation it was to receive for the work was divided up based upon geography." Id. Based
on these factors, the Hopkins Northwest Court found that, under the facts presented in that case,
the golf course construction was not readily capable of apportionment.
The work performed by Knife River is different from Warren and Hopkins Northwest in
every material respect.

Knife River performed the roadway work and the cart path work

pursuant to two separate agreements, with more than a full year separating the dates when the
relevant parties reached agreements regarding the scope of work defining the respective projects.
R. Vol. 6, p. 1042 and R. Vol. 3, p. 331; see also R. Vol. 6, p. 1036 (Daniel's Depo.
118:24-119:8).

Knife River's employees tracked their work on the two projects under two

different job numbers. Compare R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-410 with R. Vol. 3, pp. 340-345. Knife
River invoiced the work for the project using two different invoice nu.mbers, both of which
corresponded with the job numbers used by their employees for the respective projects. R. Vol.
7, p. 1153 and R. Vol. 7, p. 1155. Knife River completed work on the roadways 113 days before
it reached an agreement defming the scope of work for the cart paths. R. Vol. 3, p. 357-382 and
R. Vol. 6, p. 1044.
The district court concluded that Knife River was not required to apportion its work on
the two projects because both projects were done pursuant to a single contract-the Masco
Proposal. Dec. 23, 2011 Order at 11-13. While the lien claimants in both Hopkins Northwest
and Warren did performed their work under a single contract, the nature of their contracts were
so materially different from the two separate agreements at issue in this case, that particular
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factor adds very little to the analysis. Even if this Court finds that Knife River's two separate
agreements do constitute a single contract, it does not change the other factors deemed material
by the Hopkins Northwest and Warren Courts: namely that the two projects were (i) agreed to at
separate times, (ii) performed at separate times, (iii) tracked under separate job numbers, (iv)
invoiced under separate job numbers, and (v) constructed on different physical locations. 6
Unlike the lien claimants in Hopkins NOrlhwest and Warren, not only was Knife River's work
readily capable of apportionment, Knife River actually apportioned it at every stage of the
respective projects.
Because Knife River's work on the roadways and the cart paths was actually apportioned
by K..'1ife River, it satisfies the two or more improvements requirement of section 45-508 and this
Court must next consider whether section 45-508 applies to the type of improvements K..l1ife
River constructed.

2.

The district court improperly classified the residential roadways and golf
course cart paths as the type of improvements that are exempt from Idaho
Code § 45-508.

As an additional basis for refusing to apply Idaho Code § 45-508, the district court
incorrectly classified the roadways and cart paths as "improvements to the land" rather than
"structures." December 23, 2011 Order at 7-10. Based on Hopkins Northwest's holding that
section 45-508 does not apply to "improvements to the land" the district court refused to apply it
to Knife River's claims oflien. December 23, 2011 Order at 10.
Under ordinary principals of statutory construction, the roadways and the cart paths are
properly characterized as "structures" rather than "improvements to the land." The interpretation

6 Knife River's position that the residential subdivision and the adjacent golf course constitute a single, indivisible
development is belied by the fact that the judgment and decree of foreclosure entered in this case-which allows the
golf course to be sold separate and apart from the residential lots-demonstrates that the two improvements are,
indeed, separate.
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of a statute, and its application to the facts, are questions of law for the COlLrt. Callies v. 0 'Neal,
147 Idaho 841, 847, 216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009). When interpreting a statue that contains both
specific and general terms, the doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that "where specific words
of description are followed by general terms, the latter will be regarded as referring to persons or
things of a like class of those particularly described." Washington Water Power Co. v. Kootenai
Environmental Alliance, 99 Idaho 875, 881, 591 P.2d 122, 128 (1979). Idaho Code § 45-501

identifies "railroad" and "wagon road" in the list of specific things that is followed by the general
description "or any other structures." This somewhat archaic reference, which is the function of
the statute as originally enacted, is consistent with the type of listed in as structures in more
recent legislation. Specifically, Idaho's Contractor's Registration Ace (the "ICRA") defines
construction activities as those involving a "building, highway, road, bridge, or other
structure .... " IDAHO CODE § 54-5203(3). Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, roadways and
cart paths are sufficiently similar to a "railroad," a "wagon road," a "highway," and a "road," that
they are properly classified as "structures."
Moreover, the classification of roadways and cart paths as structures is consistent with
the history of Title 45, Chapter 5. As originally enacted, section 45-501 provided lien rights for
structures only. Hopkins Northwest, 151 Idaho at 745, 264 P.3d at 385. Given that the statute, as
originally enacted, listed wagon roads and railroads in the category of Lhings that would have
been subject to a lien, there can be no doubt that without the 1951 amendments Knife River
would have been able to successfully claim that the roadways and cartpaths were "structures"
and, therefore, would have been entitled to liens upon the same for its work. While the 1951
amendments sought to make it clear that a person was entitled to a lien for "improvements to the
7 Compliance with the ICRA is required to have a valid mechanic's lien. IDAHO CODE § 54-5208. Statutes in the
same chapter or act relating to the same subject matter should be construed in para materia. Killeen v. Vernon, 121
Idaho 94, 97, 822 P.2d 991, 994 (1991).
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land, itself, regardless of whether it was locating within the limits of an incorporated city or
town" (Id.), there is no suggestion that the legislature intended for the 1951 amendments to
reclassify the types of liens previously available. This Court should reject the district court's
classification of the roadways and cart paths as "improvements to the land" and hold, instead,
that roadways and cart paths are properly classified as structures.
The roadways and cart paths are (i) readily capable of apportionment and (ii) the type of
improvements contemplated by Idaho Code § 45-508. Accordingly, this Court should hold that
because Knife River did not designate on its claims of lien the amounts due on the two different
improvements, its liens are subordinate to all other liens on the property, including IFA's deeds
of trust.

C.

The district court erred by entering a judgment and decree of foreclosure without
first taking evidence regarding the amount of land necessary for the convenient use
and occupation of the liened res.
Even if this Court disagrees with IF A's position on the two dispositive points discussed

above, the matter should still be remanded to the district court with instructions to take evidence
regarding the amount of land subject to Knife River's claims of lien. In this matter, and over
IF A's objections, the district court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure allowing Knife
River to foreclose on less than all of the land where it performed work and on land where it did
no work at all. Moreover, the district court entered this decree of foreclosure without first taking
evidence of the amount of land necessary for the convenient use and occupation of the liened res,
in contravention ofIdaho Code § 45-505. It is the district court's statutory duty to take evidence
regarding the amount of land subject to the lien and the failure to do so mfuidates reversal. Idaho
Lumber & Hardware Co. v. DiGiacomo, 61 Idaho 383, 102 P.2d 637,639 (1940).
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The only authority within Idaho's mechanic's lien statute pursuant to which a court may
enter a decree of foreclosure on land beyond the contours of that improved by the lien claimant's
efforts is found in Idaho Code § 45-505. Chief Industries, Inc. v. Schwendiman, 99 Idaho 682,
686-87,587 P.2d 823, 827-28 (1978). The district court refused to apply section 45-505 because
it had previously classified Knife River's liens as liens for improvements to the land and,
building error upon that misclassification, the district court held that section 45-505 does not
apply to that type of lien. December 23, 2011 Order at 14. However, there is nothing within
Idaho Code § 45-505 that supports that conclusion. Indeed, the plain language of section 45-505
requires that it be applied to any and all types of lien created under section 45-501 including
improvements to the land:
The land upon which or in connection with which any
professional services are performed or any building, improvement
or structure is constructed, together with a convenient space about
the same, or so much as may be required for the convenient use
and occupation thereof. ...
(emphasis added).

Because it applies to "the land upon which any

improvement

is

constructed, together with a convenient space about the same" section 45-505, by its plain terms,
does authorize an incidental lien upon all improvements--even improvements to the land itself.
Any argument that section 45-505 should not apply because section 45-505 applies only
to improvements that have been "constructed" and improvements to the land are not fairly
characterized as "construction" can and should be rejected. Idaho's Contractor's Registration
Act makes it clear that any type of improvement contemplated by Idaho's lien law is properly
considered "construction," including improvements to the land. Notably, the legislatUre defined
"construction" as "the performance of building, altering, repairing, adding to, subtracting

from, improving, reconstructing, moving, excavating, wrecking or demolishing any building,
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highway, road, bridge, or other structure, project development or improvement to real property
.... " IDAHO CODE § 54-5203(3) (emphasis added). This language necessary includes activities
that give rise to improvements to the land, as contemplated by the second part of 45-501.
Accordingly, even though improvements to the land do not necessarily result in a structure, they
are still properly referred to as construction, and section 45-505 should apply.
The district court refused to apply section 45-505 on the grounds that it had previously
concluded that Knife River's claims of lien were of the second type created by section 45-501.
While Idaho Code § 45-501 does grant a lien upon the land for improvements to the land, section
45-501 does not indicate how much land is subject to such lien and does not contain any
authority allowing the district court to enter a judgment and decree of foreclosure that encompass
land where the lien claimant did no work. Schwendiman, 99 Idaho at 686-87, 587 P.2d at
827-28. Similarly, section 45-501 does not allow a court to enter a decree of foreclosure on less
than all of the land subject to the lien. Accord A. A. Baxter Corp. v. Home Owners & Lenders, 7
Cal. App. 3d 725, 858-59 (1970) (criticizing decree of foreclosure related to a lien for grading
and leveling on the grounds that it allowed lien claimant to recover the entire amount from a
subsection of the tract graded, thereby subjecting the foreclosed property to a disproportionate
share of the amount due); CS& W Contractors, Inc. v. Southwest Savings & Loan Assoc., 883
P.2d 404 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that the decree of foreclosure must equitably apportion the liens
as per the different lots subject to the lien so as to not place an undue burden on a subset of the
land where the work was performed). 8
There is no authority within section 45-501 for the district court to have entered a
judgment and decree of foreclosure that excludes land where Knife River did the majority of the
Consistent with this authority, Knife River did equitably apportion the amounts due and owing from the individual
lots that were subject to the Laidlaw, Aebischer, Youngblood, Scot, Benson, Status Homes, and Zameke liens. R.
Vol. 6, p. 864 (Krueck Aff., ~~ 10 & 11).

8

CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 24

work and which includes land where Knife River did no work. Because the clear, unambiguous
language of section 45-505 applies to all types of liens created by section 45-501-including the
construction of improvements to the land-the district court erred by refusing to take evidence
regarding the amount of incidental land necessary for the convenient use and occupation of the
res subject to Knife River's claim of lien. Accordingly, this matter should be remanded with
instructions to take such evidence.

V. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, IF A requests that this Court reverse the decision of the district
court and hold, instead, that IFA's interest in the subject property are superior to Knife River's
claims of lien. Alternatively, IFA requests that this Court reverse the district court's decision
and remand with instructions to take evidence regarding the amount of land necessary for the
convenient use and occupation of the land subject to the lien.
DATED this 10th day of December, 2013.
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON

Rebecca A. Rainey - of
Attorneys for Integrated Financial Associates, Inc.,
Geneva Equities, LLC and Idaho GolfPartners, Inc.
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